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Abstract: Various states and other local jurisdictions have enacted laws intending to reduce 
predatory and abusive lending in the subprime mortgage market. These laws have created 
substantial geographic variation in the regulation of mortgage credit. This article examines 
whether these laws are associated with a higher or lower cost of credit. Empirical results 
indicate that the laws are associated with at most a modest increase in cost. However, the 
impact depends on the product type. In particular, loans with fixed (adjustable) rates are 
associated with a modest increase (decrease) in cost.  
 
Predatory lending laws are today’s usury laws. The laws focus on the high cost or 
subprime segment of the mortgage market and typically restrict certain types of loans such as 
loans with prepayment penalties and balloon payments. Those borrowers who are still able to 
get a loan when a law is in place may be required to pay for at least part of the regulatory costs 
associated with complying or violating the laws (assuming compliance is nontrivial).  
This article tests to see whether the existence of a predatory lending law is associated 
with systematic change in annual percentage rates (APRs)—which represent the full cost of 
borrowing, including upfront points and fees—or with higher periodic interest rates. In addition, a 
law index is used to measure the relative strength of each law and test whether stronger laws, in 
terms of restrictions and coverage, differentially impact the cost of credit.  
The major findings of this article are that Home Mortgage Disclosure Data (HMDA), even 
with the interest rate information collected since 2004, provide insufficient information to learn 
about the impact of predatory lending laws on the cost of credit. However, using a more detailed 
and national data set of subprime loans, we find that stronger laws, as measured by their extent 
of restrictiveness, tend to increase the cost of borrowing on fixed-rate loans. In contrast, 
stronger laws tend to be associated with a lower cost for adjustable-or hybrid-rate loans. We 
propose that this potential paradox can be explained by the ability of the lender to pass the 
costs of regulatory compliance for adjustable-rate loans on to the consumer in ways that do not 
affect the APR calculation.  
The introduction of predatory lending laws at the state, county and city levels has 
provided substantial geographic variation in the regulation of high-cost mortgage credit. We 
largely focus on the impact of state laws because they have been the most durable in the face 
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of legal challenges mounted by lending associations and other forms of government. Because 
state boundaries reflect political and not economic regions, we compare mortgage market 
conditions in states with a law in effect
1 
with those in neighboring states currently without a 
predatory lending law. Instead of examining whole states or regions, we focus on multistate 
metropolitan and micropolitan areas that cross state boundaries with variations in the laws. This 
geographic-based sampling is similar, at least in spirit, to the approach used by Pence (2006) 
when studying the impact of state-level foreclosure laws. By examining mortgages in similar 
labor and housing markets, this sampling approach aids in the identification of the impact of 
state predatory lending laws on the cost of subprime credit.  
 
Subprime and Predatory Lending  
The subprime mortgage market provides the opportunity of homeownership and access 
to credit to those who are not eligible to take part in the prime or conventional market. Therefore, 
the subprime market completes the mortgage market and can enhance welfare (Chinloy and 
MacDonald 2005). Predatory lending depends on the inability of the borrower to understand the 
loan terms and the obligations associated with them. For example, interviews held by the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
(Treasury) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve 
Board) indicate that some, perhaps many, borrowers using high-cost loans may not have 
understood the terms of the loans, leading to extremely high interest rates and upfront fees 
(HUD-Treasury 2000, Federal Reserve 2002).  
In 2002, partly in response to these hearings, the Federal Reserve Board strengthened 
the existing Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) as articulated in Regulation Z. 
HOEPA defines a class of loans that are given special consideration because they are more 
likely to have predatory features and require additional disclosures. HOEPA-covered loans 
(loans where HOEPA applies) include only closed-end home equity loans that meet APR and 
upfront finance fees that trigger coverage. Hence, these are typically referred to as the APR and 
fees triggers. Home purchase loans and other types of lending backed by a home, such as lines 
of credit, are not covered by HOEPA.  
However, the continuing market penetration of subprime lenders and the geographic 
concentration of subprime lending in low-income and minority neighborhoods have led to 
concerns in many communities that HOEPA did not do enough to restrict loans likely to contain 
predatory features. By the end of 2004 at least 23 states had passed predatory lending laws 
that are currently in effect; including Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
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Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and 
Wisconsin.  
These laws follow the structure of HOEPA by defining a class of loans likely to be 
associated with predation and then restrict certain practices for covered loans. Ho and 
Pennington-Cross (2006) detail in the Appendix each of the predatory lending laws. We created 
an index to measure the strength of each law. The index can be broken down into a coverage 
component and a restrictions component. The coverage category includes measures of loan 
purpose, APR first lien, APR higher liens and points and fees. In general, if the law does not 
increase the coverage beyond HOEPA it is assigned zero points. Higher points are assigned if 
the coverage is more general. The restrictions index includes measures of prepayment penalty 
restrictions, balloon restrictions, counseling requirements and restrictions on mandatory 
arbitration. If the law does not require any restrictions on covered loans, then zero points are 
assigned. Higher points indicate more restrictions. The index is scaled so that each of the eight 
subcomponents is on average equal to one.
2 
Therefore, as shown in Table 1, by design the 
average index has the value of eight. However, there is wide variation from a low of just less 
than 1.5 for the laws in Maine and Nevada to over 17 for the law in Illinois. There is also 
substantial variation in the extent of restriction and coverage. In addition, the restrictions and 
coverage components are not strongly correlated.
3  
 
Literature Review  
There is a growing literature relating local and state predatory lending laws to conditions 
in the subprime mortgage market. Primarily the literature has focused on case studies on a law-
by-law basis. Overall there is strong evidence that the introduction of the first state-level 
predatory lending law in North Carolina did reduce the number of applications and originations 
of subprime loans (Ernst, Farris and Stein 2002, Quercia, Stegman and Davis 2003, Elliehausen 
and Staten 2004, Harvey and Nigro 2004) and the laws passed in Chicago and Philadelphia, 
which are no longer in effect, also had a similar impact (Harvey and Nigro 2003). However, the 
impacts found in these studies have turned out not to be the typical market response to the 
introduction of predatory lending laws. In particular, the laws can have no impact on decrease 
and even increase the number of applications and originations for subprime loans (Ho and 
Pennington-Cross 2006). One explanation for the increased application rate after a law is 
passed is that potential applicants may feel more comfortable applying for a subprime loan if a 
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lending law covers their application.
4 
As a result, the subprime market can actually grow after a 
law has been enacted. In contrast, laws that reduce applications and originations have stronger 
restrictions. Stronger laws are also associated with lower rejection rates on subprime 
applications.  
In contrast to the growing literature on the flow (applications and originations) of 
subprime credit much less is known about the impact of the laws on the pricing or cost of credit. 
Pricing in the subprime market is not as transparent or homogeneous as in the prime market 
(White 2004, Crews Cutts and Van Order 2005, Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 2006), 
making identifying the impact of predatory lending laws on the cost of credit more difficult. In 
particular, different interest rates are charged based on prior mortgage payment history, credit 
scores, down payments and various loan characteristics. In addition, the growing dominance of 
adjustable-rate loans in the subprime market (using LoanPerformance data adjustable-rate 
mortgage originations have grown from 40% of the market in 2000 to over 65% in 2005) 
requires careful consideration of the detailed characteristics of a loan (e.g., margin, teaser, cap 
and floor and index).5 In addition, there is some evidence that subprime borrowers tend to pay 
much higher fees during origination and underwriting (Stein 2001) making it important to 
measure the full cost of borrowing in addition to the initial or periodic interest rate on the loan.  
Li and Ernst (2005) examine the impact of various state predatory lending laws on the 
spread between prevailing risk-free rates and the periodic or initial interest rate on subprime 
loans. Their data set represents securitized subprime loans, which may include A-and Alt-A 
loans, leased from LoanPerformance as represented in their asset-backed securities (ABS) data 
sets. This data set provides extensive detail on product types, but does not provide full 
coverage of the subprime market. All of the United States is included in the sample and 34 
dummy variables are used to characterize the different nuances of the lending laws. The results 
do not provide any consistent evidence that state predatory lending laws have a recognizable 
impact on periodic interest rates. Some coefficients have negative signs; others have positive 
signs and over one-half of coefficient estimates are insignificant. Given the number of loans 
used to conduct the analysis (ranging from over 100,000 to over 450,000), the results should be 
very precise. Therefore, to date there is no consistent evidence (that we are aware of) that local 
and state predatory lending laws are associated with a consistent change in the cost of credit in 
the mortgage market.  
 
Motivation—Cost of Credit  
If lenders incur higher cost due to the introduction of predatory lending laws, then these 
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costs might be passed on to consumers in the form of higher fees and higher interest rates on 
the loans. Lenders must report to local authorities the nature and extent of high-cost (covered) 
loans they originate and make sure that they are not violating any of the predatory laws. This 
may be fairly simple to do for a local lender, but for a national lender it is necessary to monitor 
all state and local lending laws that are pending and in effect, as well as any legal challenges 
and changes to these laws.  
If the laws create a regulatory burden on lenders and this burden or cost is passed on to 
consumers, then borrower cost should be higher in locations with the law in effect. In addition, 
the laws could differentially impact periodic interest rates, initial points and fees and product 
types.  
Because adjustable rates are the dominant form of lending in the subprime market it is 
important to consider differences between the pricing of fixed-rate and adjustable-rate 
mortgages. Consider a two-period model following the work of Brueckner (1986) and Sa-Aadu 
and Sirmans (1989).6 The two-period model allows a simple illustration of the role of uncertainty 
in the pricing of mortgages and the impact of changing interest rates. The rate on a mortgage in 
the first time period, t = 0 (the initial rate), is defined as  
 
     ,                                                                                                                                                	1 
 
where , the interest rate in the first time period, is defined as the sum of the initial rate 
on an index 	 plus the margin (m) over the index. The margin is constant over the life of the 
loan but the index can change in the second period 	 for adjustable-rate loans. The index 
represents the cost of funds to the lender in the two time periods, t = 0 and t = 1. The margin 
compensates the lender for the risk associated with the loan. These risks include interest rate 
and credit risks.  
Loans can also include a discount 	 in the first time period below the fully indexed rate 
in the first period 	. Borrowers may also pay additional fees upfront (f) to reduce the interest 
rate, which is often referred to as points paid. Therefore, the initial rate can be represented as:  
 
        .                                                                                                                                                   	2 
 
The initial rate is defined as the sum of the index, the margin and upfront fees less the 
discount. This representation provides the cost of credit in the first time period; however, upfront 
fees are not included when calculating the fully amortizing payment. Therefore, a mortgage can 
be structured with the same expected return that includes various levels of initial rates 
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depending on the margin, discount and upfront fees. In general, when holding returns constant, 
higher fees and a higher margin or a lower discount should be associated with lower initial rates.  
In the second time period, t = 1, the rate on the mortgage is uncertain for an adjustable-
rate mortgage and depends on the index value 	, the margin (m) and any limits placed on the 
fully adjusted rate 	   as defined by a cap (u) and a floor (l).7 Therefore, the rate of return in 
the second period can take on three forms depending on whether the cap or floor is binding.  
 
      , then     ,       , then     ,                                                                                                        	3           , then     . 
 
In the second period the rate on the mortgage 	, or return to the lender, is the initial 
rate 	 plus the cap (u) if the cap is binding, the initial rate less the floor if the floor is binding 
and the fully indexed rate 	   if the cap and floor are not binding. Therefore, the cap can be 
designed to shift all the interest rate risk to the borrower or the lender. In the limit the cap and 
floor can be designed so that they are never binding 	  ∞ and   ∞ and all the interest rate 
risk is transferred to the borrower or so that it is always binding	  0 and   0. When u =0 
and l =0 the loan is equivalent to a fixed-rate mortgage. Therefore, a fixed-rate mortgage can be 
viewed as a subset or special case for adjustable-rate mortgages where the cap and floor are 
always binding.  
The index for the second period can be viewed as a random variable and the expected 
return for the second period is as follows:  
 
	   	  	    	  	 
!"#$%&
!"%'%&
!"%'%&

  	  	 
(
!"#$%&
,                                                                                          	4 
 
where 	 is the probability density function for interest rates in the second time period. 
The first terms of the equation represent the rate when the floor is binding and the realized 
interest rate is   . The second terms of the equation represent the rate when neither the cap 
nor the floor are binding and the realized interest rate is   . The last part of the equation 
represents the rate when the cap is binding and the realized interest rate is   . The cap and 
floor impact on the expected rate and the extent that the caps and floors matters depend on the 
distribution of interest rates in the second time period 	 . Because the margin is used to 
compensate for all other costs and risks, the more volatile interest rates or the index, the larger 
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the margin will need to be to compensate for the lender taking on interest rate risk. The 
expected rate can also be modified to include a measure of credit risk, which is assumed to 
occur only when the value of the mortgage is higher than the value of the property, by adding 
* +%,+ -	. . 
+
 to the expected rate.
8 
Here B is the outstanding balance on the loan, V is the 
value of the mortgage and g(V) is the probability density function for V. Because default is a 
cost, the required rate in the second period will be higher and the margin can be used to 
increase the rate to compensate for the credit risk. For a fixed-rate loan the expected rate in the 
second time period is the initial interest rate       plus the measure of credit risk 
/* +%,,
+
 -	. .0. 
This two-period model primarily shows that the margin on a loan is a complicated 
mixture of many characteristics, including the variance of future rates, credit risks (property 
values), upfront fees, discounts and caps. In particular, the margin is used to compensate the 
lender for all costs except for the cost of funds. Fixed-rate loans should require a higher margin 
to compensate for the lender being exposed to all of the interest rate risk and adjustable-rate 
loans can be viewed as being in a continuum from full-lender exposure to interest rate risk to 
no-lender exposure to interest rate risk depending on the cap. In addition, any costs associated 
with complying with local laws and regulations should be associated with a higher margin to 
maintain the required rate of return.  
 
APR  
This section examines the impact of a predatory lending law on the APR of a high-cost 
loan. HMDA provides broad coverage of most regulated lenders and the loans that they 
originate as wells as rejections and the purchases of loans in the secondary market over each 
calendar year. Unfortunately, the breadth of coverage is offset by the lack of details provided. 
For example, HMDA does not report credit scores, down payments, details on loan type or the 
interest rate on the loan. As a result, recent research using HMDA has tended to focus on the 
volume of credit by location and the outcome of applications for credit (Harvey and Nigro 2004, 
Ho and Pennington-Cross 2006). However, for the calendar year 2004, the HMDA data set 
provides the spread between the APR on high-cost mortgages and the yield on Treasury bills of 
comparable maturity (S). Using this spread this section will attempt to determine if predatory 
lending laws have affected the reported APR spread.  
The HMDA estimation sample used here includes loans under the conforming loan limit 
(no jumbo loans) for single-family (one to four units) homes and excludes manufactured homes. 
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Multifamily (five or greater units) housing is excluded because the pricing of credit is more 
strongly tied to expected cash flows and capital appreciation rates than to the credit worthiness 
of the borrower. Therefore, the sample has many different types of loans including loans for 
owner-occupied housing, investor housing, home improvement, purchase and refinance.  
An Aside About Calculating APRs  
Before discussing the identification strategy and estimation method it may be helpful to 
provide a more detailed description of what the APR represents and how it can be calculated. 
The APR represents the effective interest rate the borrower will pay on the loan assuming it is 
held to term (contractual end of the loan or last payment). The effective rate represents both 
periodic interest payments and upfront payments made on the loan. Therefore, if there are no 
upfront fees the APR on a 30-year fixed-rate loan with an interest rate of 8% is 8%. However, 
most mortgages include many fees that must be paid at or before the loan is originated. If these 
upfront costs equal 3% of the original balance of the loan and the interest rate is 8% then the 
APR on this loan is 8.32%.
9 
 
However, while the APR covers many or even most costs it does not represent the total 
cost of borrowing. For example, penalties such as late fees and routine fees not paid by the 
lender, such as home inspection fees, are not included. Typically, items such as discount points, 
prepaid interest origination fees paid by the lender, closing agent preparation fees and private 
mortgage insurance fees are all included in the APR. For the purposes of this article HMDA-
reported APR requires that lenders calculate APR in compliance with Regulation Z’s definition of 
“Finance Charge.” The “Finance Charge” paragraph lists all the specific charges and the many 
nuances that define what is included or not included in APR calculations.  
The Regulation Z rules for calculating APR for adjustable-rate and hybrid-rate loans 
require that the lender hold the index constant through time and that loans with teasers (low 
initial rates) adjust up to their fully adjusted rate as quickly as contractually possible.10 In practice 
this implies that the lender must calculate a blended or single rate that represents any future 
changes in interest rates holding the index constant and then incorporate all applicable upfront 
costs to determine the APR. In summary, while APRs are neither a perfect nor complete 
measure of borrower cost they are the best available measure.  
Identification and Estimation Strategies  
To aid identification, a geographic-based sampling approach is used. In particular, only 
loans in metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that cross state borders, where 
only one state has a predatory lending law in effect, are included. Table 2 provides a list of the 
35 MSAs included in the estimation.  
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All loans that meet the loan type and location criteria are included. A variable called 
Ineffect indicates that the loan is located in a location where a predatory lending law is currently 
in effect. Only locations where the law is in effect before the beginning of 2004 are included. 
Therefore, if there is a regulatory cost passed on to the consumer, it should be reflected in a 
positive coefficient estimate for Ineffect.  
However, HMDA only reports the spread between the APR on high-cost mortgages and 
the yield on Treasury bills of comparable maturity (S) if it is 3 percentage points or higher. The 
censoring of observations is analogous to a missing variable problem and may lead to biased 
estimates of coefficients. The solution we adopt here is to follow the two-step Heckman 
selection correction (Heckman 1979, Greene 1981).11 The first step is to estimate a probit 
equation via maximum likelihood to explain the probability of the spread being reported using a 
set of explanatory variables (z). Using the coefficient estimates we construct the “inverse Mills 
ratio,” which is often referred to as lamba 	12  3452678/Φ452678, where j indexes the individual 
loans, 3 and Φ are the partial and cumulative normal probability functions and 67 are the 
estimated coefficients for the vector of variables z. It is possible to rely on functional form for 
identification, but is preferable for z to include variables that affect the probability of reporting 
without impacting the estimated spread. Therefore, ideal candidates to aid identification are 
variables that are used for screening loans but are not used in the pricing of loans. For example, 
borrower income and the loan-to-income ratio are not included in subprime pricing tables, but 
they are likely related to probability of having a poor credit history. Other candidates could 
include location proxies not used in pricing but correlated with financial stress such as vacancy 
rates and the urban/rural breakdown.  
The second step is to augment the spread regression (S) with the inverse Mill’s ratio (λ):  
 
;2  <=  <>?2  <&@2  <AB2  <CD2  <E12  F2,                                                                                        	5 
 
where j indexes the individual loan originations, S is the spread as defined above, P 
indicates whether a loan is in a location with a predatory lending law in effect and the strength of 
the law as measured by the law index, the law coverage index, the law restrictions index, 
dummies indicating locations with very strong laws, M represents mortgage characteristics, B 
represents borrower characteristics, L represents locations characteristics, λ is the inverse mills 
ratio and ε represents a normally distributed mean 0 random error term with a variance of H.12 
Table 3 describes the variables and indicates the source for the data. Table 4 provides 
the mean and standard deviation of the variables used in the regressions. The average spread 
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is 4.15 percentage points above the comparable term Treasury bill and 51% of the sample is in 
locations with a law. Figure 1 shows the distribution of APR spread for the estimation sample 
and provides an indication of what proportion of loans would be covered by the predatory 
lending laws using the APR trigger mechanism only. The APR trigger typically varies from 6% to 
10% above the comparable Treasury yield depending on the state and the lien category. For 
example, under the Maryland law, which has a first-lien APR spread trigger of 7%, 
approximately 2% of reported first-lien loans would be covered using HMDA national 
distributions.  
Mortgage characteristics are controlled by including dummy variables for loan size and 
loan purpose (home improvement, investor and refinance). The reference loan is a purchase, 
owner-occupied and medium-sized loan. It is expected that purchase, owner-occupied loans 
have a lower risk profile and should have a lower APR. In addition, due to fixed costs associated 
with underwriting, larger loans are likely to have lower APRs also. Passmore, Sherlund and 
Burgess (2005) use loan size dummy variables to control for these fixed costs on the cost of 
credit. Borrower characteristics include borrower ethnicity and a proxy for borrower credit scores. 
Higher credit scores should be associated with lower APRs, while nonwhite borrowers, due to 
missing variables such as wealth and health status, are likely be associated with higher APRs. 
The average Fair Isaac FICO score for the census tract of the property is calculated from 2004-
originated subprime loans using the LoanPerformance Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) data set. 
Metro-and micropolitan area dummies are included to control for location-specific unobserved 
characteristics and there are no priors regarding their sign or magnitude. The summary statistics 
indicate that the high-cost HMDA loans come from locations with relatively low credit scores and 
a substantial fraction of nonwhite borrowers.
13  
APR Spread and Selection Results  
Table A1 reports the first stage, or probit, estimated coefficient and standard errors. All 
of the variables included in the second stage are also included in the probit model except the 
law variables. To aid identification, four additional variables describing the location of the loan 
and borrower characteristics in more detail are also included. In particular, borrowers with more 
income are less likely to have an APR spread reported. In contrast, borrower income was found 
to have no impact on the magnitude of the APR spread and was therefore excluded from the 
second-stage specification. In addition, the loan-to-income ratio is also found to increase the 
probability of have an APR spread reported. These finding are consistent with subprime 
underwriting standards, which use income- and debt-coverage ratios (monthly debt 
servicing/monthly income) to screen loan eligibility but are not used or have little impact on the 
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pricing of loans. In addition, consistent with prime and subprime underwriting standards 
borrowers from locations with high credit scores are less likely to have reported APR spreads.  
The second-stage results are reported in Table 5. Model 1 includes the law index. Model 
2 includes the coverage and restrictions indexes. Model 3 includes Ineffect and dummy 
variables indicating that the law was strong in terms of coverage or restrictions. Where any 
version of the law index is included, it is constructed such that the index is zero before the law is 
passed and only takes on a positive value after a law has been put in effect.  
In general the results in Table 5 indicate that predatory lending laws have only a modest 
impact on the cost of credit. Models 1 and 2 find no relationship between the strength of the 
predatory lending law and the APR spread. Model 3 indicates that loans in locations with 
stronger laws, whether measured by coverage or restrictions, paid a rather inconsequential 12.0 
to 17.9 basis points less than a comparable loan in locations without a law. In general, these 
results provide no support for the notion that predatory lending laws impose a regulatory burden 
that will be passed on to the consumer through higher interest rates or upfront fees. In fact, 
strong laws seem to be associated with reductions in APRs.  
The mortgage, borrower and location controls largely meet expectations. For example, 
smaller loans have higher spreads likely indicating the role of fixed underwriting costs and 
potentially higher loss rate relative to jumbo loans.14 In addition, spreads are higher for home 
improvement loans and refinances. However, there does not seem to be a premium associated 
with investor loans. In terms of locations and borrower characteristics, nonwhite households are 
associated with higher spreads, and Hispanic borrowers are not associated with any detectable 
difference in spreads. As indicated earlier, if nonwhite borrowers are associated with 
unobserved characteristics that would increase the cost of borrowing, then this may be reflected 
in the nonwhite coefficient estimate. The proxy for credit score, the subprime FICO tract-level 
average, is also associated with lower spreads. The location-specific dummy variables are both 
positive and negative and are significant a little over one-half of the time. These results indicate 
that interest rate premiums for subprime loans may reflect perceptions of the risks associated 
with each location and the legal environment (Ambrose and Buttimer 2005).  
In terms of sample selection issues the results indicate that it is important to control for 
the probability of reporting the APR spread. The inverse Mills ratio is significant and positive in 
all specifications. We also ran simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that confirm the 
results presented here. Coefficient estimates are very similar (almost exactly the same). 
However, the OLS versions of Models 1 and 2 find that the impact of the law index and the 
coverage index are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Differences-in-Differences and Interest Rates  
While the HMDA specification allows for the study of the full cost of borrowing, as 
measured by the APR, it does not include important variables used in the pricing and 
underwriting of subprime loans such as credit scores and down payments.
15 
HMDA also does 
not permit the identification of adjustable- and fixed-rate loan types. To alleviate some of these 
issues, data from LoanPerformance on securitized subprime loans are used in this section. The 
data include individual loan down payment, FICO score at origination, great detail about the 
loan type and adjustable rate details such as the margin and caps on periodic interest rate 
adjustments. However, the APR is not reported and there is no information on the upfront fees 
and points paid.
16 
 
However, the LoanPerformance data do not represent all of the subprime mortgage 
market. While it does cover a vast majority of the securitized subprime it does not provide good 
coverage of the higher cost segments (B- & C-grade segments). Therefore, it is best to regard 
these results as reflecting the impact of laws on the just less than prime segment of subprime or 
the A-segment.  
To remove some unobserved heterogeneity, we limit the sample to first-lien 30-year 
fixed-and adjustable-(hybrid) rate for purchase and refinance loans secured by single-family 
property. As with the HMDA-based model we limit the analysis to loans that meet the 
conforming loan limit. In addition, both owner-occupied and investor loans are included in the 
sample as well as refinances that take cash out and those that do not. We also limit our 
attention to the dominant type of adjustable-rate mortgage in subprime, the 2/28 adjustable-rate 
mortgage (2/28 ARM), which is a hybrid loan whose rate is fixed for the first two years and 
adjustable for the next 28 years.17 Adjustments to the periodic interest rate are indexed to the 
six-month London interbank offered rate (LIBOR). However, the 2/28 ARM still has substantial 
heterogeneity in terms of adjustment caps, teasers and other factors that will need to be 
controlled for to create an accurate loan-level measure of the interest rate cost.  
As with the previous HMDA analysis, only metropolitan and micropolitan areas with 
variations in laws are included in the sample. However, the LoanPerformance data are available 
through time. Time variation can be used to improve identification of the impact of the law 
coming into effect. We sample loans before and after the law comes into effect. In particular, 
only loan originations from 6 to 18 months before and 6 to 18 months after the law becomes 
effective are included in the sample. This “donut” hole sampling approach makes sure that any 
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temporary adjustments to the law are not included in coefficient estimates.  
The key variable of interest is Ineffect. This variable indicates that a loan is in a location 
when and where a predatory lending law is effective, or “in effect.” It is defined as zero before 
the law is effective regardless of law status. Ineffect is constructed by interacting the variable 
law, which indicates locations where the law will eventually be in effect, and postlaw, which 
indicates the time period after a law, has become in effect. Therefore, law identifies the 
treatment location and postlaw identifies the time period the treatment is in effect. There are no 
priors regarding the coefficients on law or postlaw, because they will capture prevailing market 
conditions that are not controlled for by other variables. Dummy variables are included for each 
MSA and interacted with both postlaw and law. Therefore, location- and time-specific effects for 
each MSA are controlled for by this set of variables.
18 
The remaining variation associated with 
the time period when the law is in effect in the location with a law (ineffect) is interpreted as the 
impact of the law on the spread. This type of dummy structure is commonly referred to as a 
differences-in-differences estimation due to the time-and location-control variables. In addition, 
the geographic sampling strategy aids identification of the laws’ impact.  
Specification  
Two main features used to determine interest rates are credit history and down 
payments (or the loan-to-value, (LTV) ratio). It is important to consider whether these variables 
could be endogenous and jointly determined with the interest or spread on the mortgage. We 
use the Fair Isaac’s FICO score to proxy for credit history. FICO scores are used by prominent 
lenders such as Countrywide and IndyMac Bank as part of their pricing and interest rate 
matrices (Crews Cutts and Van Order 2005, Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 2006). 
However, FICO scores reflect a long history of past payments and are difficult to improve in the 
short run. In contrast, credit scores can be negatively and dramatically affected by new 
derogatory information such as a charge-off or bankruptcy. Therefore, we treat FICO as an 
exogenous variable.  
We also use the LTV of the loan at origination because it also plays an important role in 
the pricing matrices. Larger down payments (smaller LTVs) are used by lenders to help 
compensate for other risk factors such as weak credit history. Therefore, for borrowers who are 
not wealth constrained, the down payment can be used to adjust to the prevailing interest rates 
and thus LTVs and interest rates may be jointly determined. For example, Ling and McGill 
(1998) show that the demand for mortgage debt is affected by borrower income, wealth and 
other factors. Ambrose, LaCour-Little and Sanders (2004) use borrower income and age to 
proxy for wealth to identify the LTV equation in a similar mortgage spread analysis, which 
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focused on the impact of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on the cost of credit. Unfortunately, our 
data set does not include borrower income or age, but we can use the 2000 Census data on ZIP 
code average income and age as proxies for wealth.
19 
In addition, they also include a measure 
of prevailing interest rates to proxy for debt servicing cost. We estimate the following system of 
equations using two-stage least squares in SAS version 9.1 for Windows:  
 
IJ2  K=  K'L2  K!2&MN  KOP2  KQR2  KNS2  KCD2  F2 C                                                         	6 
 
;2  <=  <>?2  <&@2  <AB2  <CÎJ2  F2V.                                                                                   	7 
 
In the first equation, ltv is the loan-to-value ratio indexed over j mortgages, F is the Fair 
Isaac’s credit score, r
mkt 
is the prevailing prime 30-year fixed mortgage rate (Freddie Mac 
Primary Mortgage Market Survey®) in the month of origination), I is the ZIP code average 
income, A is the ZIP code average age, T is a vector of year dummies from 1998 through 2005 
and L is a vector of MSA dummies. In the second equation, S is the interest rate spread 
(interest rate less 10-year Treasury yield or LIBOR depending on rate type), P represent 
predatory lending laws and their identification, M and B represent mortgage, borrower and 
location characteristics, and ÎJ is the predicted loan-to-value ratio from the first stage. FC and FV 
represent identically and independently distributed random error terms.  
To identify the impact of the law, P includes the previously discussed series of MSA 
dummies and postlaw and law interacted with the MSA dummies. Vectors M and B include 
FICO, the borrower’s Fair Isaac credit score as well as detailed information on loan type.  
Table 6 provides definitions of the variables used and Table 7 provides summary 
statistics for the estimation samples. The system of equations is estimated separately for fixed 
and adjustable-rate mortgages. Table 7 reports the aggregate or pooled means for the variables 
for law and postlaw, while during the estimation there is a unique postlaw and law for each MSA. 
For fixed-rate loans the spread is the difference between the interest rate on the loan and the 
yield on 10-year treasury bills (spread_frm). For adjustable-rate loans the spread is defined as 
the margin on the loan or the difference between the fully index rate and the index (spread_arm). 
The data set is limited to first-lien 30-year term loans and the adjustable-rate loans are limited to 
the dominant type that are the 2/28 ARMs indexed to the six month LIBOR, with rate adjusted 
every six months (after being fixed the first two years).20  
In general, subprime lenders charge more for lower credit scores and higher LTVs; 
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therefore, spreads should be higher for loans with higher LTVs and lower FICO scores.
21 
Loans 
for which the borrower provides little documentation (low doc) or no documentation (no doc) are 
likely to pay a premium to compensate for inaccurate, unstable or illegal income and wealth 
sources. As in the HMDA specification, loan size dummy variables are included in the analysis 
to capture the impact of fixed costs of origination and servicing being spread across larger loans. 
Therefore, we expect that larger loans should pay lower spreads. Dummies indicating whether 
the loan is for purchase, refinance with additional cash taken (refi_cashout) and refinance 
without taking additional cash out (refi_nocash) may also affect the interest rate. Property that is 
purchased for investment opportunities (investor) or other purposes (other_purpose) is also 
likely to pay a premium. Some of the loans also have Private Mortgage Insurance (PMI).22 PMI 
insures the lender against losses incurred in the event that the borrower defaults on the loan. 
The borrower, not the lender, pays for this insurance. Therefore, a borrower who uses PMI 
should also be compensated by the lender with lower interest rates or fees, holding all other 
variables constant.  
As previously discussed, adjustable-rate loans often have caps and floors placed on the 
extent that the interest rate can change over time. Although we have only referred to caps as if 
there is only one type, in practice caps can restrict interest rate resets on the first reset date and 
then on all subsequent reset dates. In particular, we include measures of the caps for the first 
adjustable time period and all subsequent time periods as percentages of the initial interest rate 
on the mortgage. Because the rate on a 2/28 ARM is fixed for the first two years, if interest rates 
go up it could require a large interest rate adjustment to reach the fully indexed rate (index plus 
margin). Therefore, most loans impose looser caps in the first adjustment than in subsequent 
periods. For example, the first period cap, fcap, is 30% (not percentage points) on average, 
while the subsequent periodic cap, pcap, is 14% on average.
23 
Adjustable-rate loans also can 
include teasers that initially set the interest rate below the fully indexed rate. The average teaser 
is 32 basis points. In addition, the inclusion of caps means that lenders are subject to interest 
rate risks. The two-period model theory indicates that, if the index on an adjustable-rate loan is 
more volatile, the margin should be higher to compensate the lender. We include a measure of 
index volatility in the adjustable-rate loan model, namely, variance over the prior six months of 
the six-month LIBOR (labor_var).  
Ambrose and Sanders (2005) show that interest rates can also be affected by other 
important market factors. In particular, they examine the impact of the difference between the 
“AAA” bond index and the “BAA” bond index to proxy for the cost of borrowing as well as a 
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measure of the yield curve. In addition, consistent with the two-period model used above and 
from the options pricing framework, the volatility of house prices and interest rates are central to 
the value of a mortgage and hence it’s pricing and mortgage interest rates. To control for these 
and other unobserved factors, time dummies are included that are specific to each metropolitan 
area for the one-year sample before and after the law comes into effect. Therefore, these 
dummies will represent all national and micropolitan area and metropolitan area level factors 
that could affect interest rates in the mortgage market and spreads associated specifically with 
subprime lending.  
Results  
Table 7 indicates that the primary difference between adjustable- and fixed-rate loans is 
that adjustable-rate loans tend to be a little larger and the borrower’s credit score tends to be 
lower (597 vs. 660).  
Details on the results of the first stage or LTV results are presented in Table A3. The 
results largely meet expectations. Tables 8 and 9 report the results for the second stage or the 
spread results for both the fixed-rate and adjustable-rate specifications (Equation 7) in which the 
predicted LTV 	ÎJ is used. The results differ from those found using HMDA and the results for 
fixed-rate loans differ from those for adjustable-rate loans. The fixed-rate results emphasize that 
laws with a lot of restrictions on the types of credit available and the behavior of lenders can 
modestly increase interest rates on a loan. For example, while the overall index is statistically 
insignificant the restrictions index is associated with higher interest rates and laws with strong 
restrictions tend to pay an additional 22 basis points more (the opposite of that found using the 
HMDA data). This is consistent with the notion that lender compliance cost is fairly minimal for 
most lenders. In contrast, the impact of the laws on adjustable-rate spreads or margin is much 
more similar to the findings using HMDA data. In general, stronger laws are associated with 
slightly lower interest rates and this reduction is driven by the extent of coverage, not the extent 
of restrictions. In particular, Model 3 indicates that laws with the most broad coverage are 
associated with an 11 basis point reduction in interest rates.
24 
 
Control variables for location (MSA dummies), law status (law ∗ MSA dummies) and time 
for each MSA (postlaw ∗ MSA dummies) are not reported because we have no priors regarding 
significance or sign. As expected coefficient estimates vary substantially with about two-thirds 
being significant. Borrower and mortgage characteristics also perform as expected. For example, 
higher credit scores are associated with lower spreads for both adjustable- and fixed-rate loans. 
In fact, many of the coefficients for adjustable- and fixed-rate loans provide similar findings. For 
example, small loans, low documentation loans, for purchase loans and loans for purposes 
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other than owner occupation (other purpose or investor) all have higher spreads. However, 
some variables have different signs and levels of significance. In general, results will reflect the 
underwriting standards as they are applied to different product types. For example, there should 
be no inherent difference between an identical refinanced loan and a for-purchase loan; 
however, refinance loans that do not take any cash out are associated with lowers spreads for 
both adjustable- and fixed-rate loans. Therefore, this result likely reflects unobserved factors 
associated with refinances that tend to make them less risky than for-purchase loans.  
Mortgage characteristics for adjustable-rate loans perform as expected. For example, as 
predicted by the two-period model used to motivate differences between fixed and adjustable-
rate loans, loans with larger teasers pay a higher spread than loans without teasers. In addition, 
loans with broad caps (less likely to be binding) on interest rate adjustments pay a lower spread 
because the borrower is assuming more of the interest rate risk. However, inconsistent with the 
theory, but consistent with prior empirical estimates, the variance of the index is associated with 
lower spreads (Sprecher and Willman 1998).  
In summary, the results showed a modest positive and negative impact of predatory 
lending laws on interest spreads for fixed-rate and adjustable-rate loans, respectively. These 
results may reflect the ability of lenders to adjust the terms of adjustable-rate loans in order to 
comply with the requirements of a predatory lending law. The decline in interest rates was 
associated with laws that provided broad coverage, while the rise in fixed rates was tied to the 
restrictiveness of the law. While it is beyond the scope of this article to definitively determine the 
cause, it may be that laws that apply to many loans reduce any legal liability or legal uncertainty 
for lenders and secondary market investors.  
Can the Reported APR be Manipulated to Avoid Law Coverage?  
In this section we examine how the reported APR can be adjusted by manipulating caps 
and teasers on 2/28 ARMs, while holding lender expected returns constant. As stated earlier, 
the Regulation Z-compliant APR as reported in HMDA, assumes that the loans is held to the 
end of the contract and that the index is constant through time. Therefore, a 2/28 ARM that does 
not have a teaser has the same APR as a 30-year fixed-rate loan (assuming the initial interest 
rates and upfront fees are identical).  
Consider how caps on future changes in interest rates could impact the reported APR. 
We can use the results in Table 9 (Model 1) to define the fully indexed rate for a loan for various 
cap strengths that has the same expected return for the lender. Using an “average” 
representative loan that has no upfront costs and no teaser we can calculate the fully indexed 
rate for different caps. Because we assume no upfront costs and no teaser the fully indexed rate 
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is the APR. We define a low cap as one standard deviation below the average, a medium cap 
as the average and a high cap as one standard deviation above the average. If LIBOR is 5% 
then the APR for the representative low-cap loan is 13.05%, for the representative medium-cap 
loan is 11.84% and for the representative high-cap loan is 9.44%. Therefore, by shifting the 
interest rate risk from the lender to the borrower the APR can be impacted by over 250 basis 
points.  
As a result, it is possible to shift a significant proportion of borrowers so that the 
predatory lending law does not apply (not covered). Take, for example, the laws in Illinois and 
Washington D.C., both of which have a first-lien APR spread triggers of 6%. These laws, using 
the HMDA national distributions in Figure 1, cover about 5.5% of loans, using only the APR 
trigger. Assuming a one-percentage-point change in the margin roughly corresponds to the 
same change in the APR, adjusting the caps by 10% in these locations can have the effect of 
shifting about two-thirds of previously covered loans out of the laws’ coverage. As a result, 
these borrowers will be facing more volatility in interest rates and payments in the future. While 
this may not be a concern in a “down rate” environment, if interest rates increase substantially 
these borrowers will experience larger payment shocks than they would have with more 
stringent caps in place.  
In addition, we calculated the percentage change in the cap strength over the prelaw to 
postlaw period for both control and treatment locations and found that cap measures have 
loosened more in locations with a law coming into effect. For example, the first-period (periodic) 
cap loosened by 17% (6.5) in locations without a law, compared with 42.5% (16.9) in locations 
with a law coming into effect. Therefore, in locations where a predatory lending law comes into 
effect interest rate risk has been more aggressively shifted to the borrower.  
To test whether initial rate teasers could also be used to avoid law coverage consider 
three representative loans: (1) a loan with no teaser, (2) a loan with an average teaser and (3) a 
loan with a high teaser (mean plus one standard deviation). Assume that all other variables are 
evaluated at their means and a 5% LIBOR over the life of the loan. Holding lender-expected 
returns constant, the initial rate, margin and fully indexed rate can then be calculated using the 
results in Table 9. Assuming no upfront costs the APR is calculated as the blended rate (internal 
rate of return) at par.25 The results indicate that the reported APR would be lowest for the loan 
without a teaser and highest for the loan with a high teaser (9.44% vs. 10.13%). Therefore, the 
lender cannot avoid the predatory lending law by using stronger or bigger initial rate teasers.  
From the lender’s perspective it is important to consider that expected holding period or 
life of a subprime loan is substantially shorter than 30 years assumed in the Regulation Z APR 
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calculations. For example, using the same assumptions as above but truncating the holding 
period to five years the APR on the loan without a teaser stays at 9.44% but the loan with a high 
teaser is reduced to 7.25%. Therefore, a loan with a teaser has a higher-reported APR but a 
lower-expected return. These results reinforce the finding that teasers will not be used to avoid 
predatory lending laws because the reported APR is based on the full 30 years not the expected 
holding period.  
 
Summary and Conclusion  
Since 1999, state and local predatory lending laws have spread to a geographically and 
demographically divergent collection of locations, including the states Maine, Maryland and 
Nevada, among many others. The laws tend to follow the structure of federal regulations as 
articulated by HOEPA; however, the local nature of the regulation has lead to spatially 
differentiated predatory lending laws, which have become today’s usury laws. This article 
examines whether these laws are associated with increases or decreases in the cost of credit. 
Evidence that the cost of credit increases when a law is enacted is consistent with a regulatory 
compliance cost being passed onto the consumer. In contrast, evidence that the cost of credit 
decreases when a law is introduced provides additional support for beliefs that (1) predation has 
been a substantial problem in the subprime mortgage market and/or (2) lenders and borrower 
have been able to find alternative types of loans not covered by the law.  
The results of this article provide two different and potentially contradictory results. For 
example, in preliminary evidence using HMDA data, the APR (includes the periodic interest rate 
and upfront points and fees) spread is negatively associated with the introduction of a predatory 
lending law. That is, the cost of credit is lower when there is a law after controlling for borrower, 
location and some loan type characteristics. However, this data set suffers because it cannot 
control for crucial parts of the subprime (risk-based pricing) underwriting paradigm. For example, 
the endogenously determined down payment and the credit score of the borrower are not 
available. HMDA also cannot distinguish between adjustable- and fixed-rate loan types and 
provides no detail on the unique characteristics of adjustable-rate loans, such as teasers, caps 
on interest rate adjustments and the margin (the premium paid above the index when the rate is 
fully adjusted).  
An alternative set of results, using a different data set that provides great detail about 
loan type, has substantially different results. This data set provides a time series at the loan 
level that allows for a more complete differences-in-differences specification that can control for 
location and the time period before and after the law is approved and put into effect. However, 
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this data set does not provide any information on upfront fees and points. In a cross-section 
estimation designed to mimic HMDA (no distinction made on rate adjustment type), the results 
for the interest rate spread were very similar to the results for the APR spread when using 
HMDA. However, when a more complete model is formulated, the results indicate that the 
impact of the law depends on product type. In particular, for consumers using fixed-rate loans 
the laws that have strong restrictions on allowable lending impose modest regulatory costs that 
are passed to consumer. In contrast, for consumers using adjustable-rate loans the laws had a 
small negative impact on the cost of borrowing.  
One interpretation of this result is that it is relatively easy to find a substitute adjustable-
rate loan that can evade coverage of the law while maintaining the same expected return for the 
lender. For example, one way to avoid being subject to a law is to reduce the APR below a 
predetermined threshold. This can be done, while holding constant lender-expected rates of 
return on an adjustable-rate loan only, by shifting the interest rate risk from the lender to the 
borrower by adjusting interest rate caps. However, this product shift is also likely to impact 
default risk.  
In summary, the results indicate that state and local predatory lending laws have at most 
a modest regulatory cost in terms of interest rates, which is passed on to consumers. However, 
this cost is only directly observable for fixed-rate loans because it is straightforward on 
adjustable-rate loans to evade law coverage by manipulating interest rate adjustment caps. In 
addition, while the 2004 release of HMDA may seem like a good source of information on 
borrower cost, any results are likely biased as a result of missing variables and misspecification.  
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Endnotes  
1 
Laws are first enacted by the local legislature and become effective typically at a 
later date. It is not until the law becomes in effect that lenders are required to follow the new 
rules and restrictions.  
2 
More details on the scaling and creation of the index are available in Ho and 
Pennington-Cross (2006). Before scaling of the index, points are assigned to each law using the 
following scheme:  
Coverage: Loan Purpose (HOEPA equivalent = 0, all loans except government loans = 1, all 
loans except reverse or open loans = 2, all loans except reverse, business or construction loans 
= 3 and all loans with exceptions = 4), APR Trigger first Lien (8%, HOEPA equivalent = 0, 7% = 
1, 6% = 2 and no trigger = 3), APR Trigger Higher Liens (10%, HOEPA equivalent = 0, 9% = 1, 
8% = 2, 7% = 3 and no trigger = 4), Points and Fees Trigger (8%, HOEPA equivalent = 0, 6%–
7% = 1, 5% = 2, <5% = 3 and no trigger = 4).  
Restrictions: Prepayment Penalty Prohibitions (no restriction = 0, prohibition or percentage limits 
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after 60 months = 1, prohibition or percentage limits after 36 months = 2, prohibition or 
percentage limits after 24 months = 3 and no penalties allowed = 4), Balloon Prohibitions (no 
restriction = 0, no balloon if term < seven years (all term restrictions) = 1, no balloon in first 10 
years of mortgage = 2, no balloon in first 10 years of mortgage and Cleveland = 3 and no 
balloons allowed = 4), Counseling Requirements (not required = 0, and required = 1), 
Mandatory Arbitration Limiting Judicial Relief (Allowed = 0, partially restricted = 1 and prohibited 
= 2).  
3 
There is also a history of laws being changed after market reactions by the primary 
market, secondary market and rating agencies. For example, the first version of the law in 
Georgia allowed potentially unlimited punitive damages for violating the law and this liability 
extended to loan assignees, which includes the securitization trust. As a result, Fitch and Moody 
refused to rate Georgia-covered loans, Freddie Mac stated that they would not purchase any 
securities backed by mortgages in Georgia, and many lenders stated they would not lend high-
cost loans, including Ameriquest, Chase, Citi, Wells Fargo and others. Not surprisingly, the 
Georgia law was amended and capped assignee liability.  
4 
An alternative explanation is that lenders respond by increasing the promotion or 
supply of subprime credit after a law is passed because any uncertainty about the legality of the 
loans has been removed.  
5 
Consistent with the expectation theory of interest rates, the market share of 
adjustable-rate loans has historically been sensitive to the shape of the yield curve. The current 
time period will help to reveal if subprime loans are equally sensitive to interest issues or if 
product selection is dominated by other forces such as affordability, need for cash, and so on, 
mixed with very short expected holding periods.  
6 
An alternative approach is to follow options pricing theory (e.g., Buser, Hendershott 
and Sanders 1985, Hendershott and Shilling 1985, Kau et al. 1990).  
7 
Because this is a two-period model, no distinction is necessary between floors and 
caps over the life of the mortgage or from period to period. In actual mortgages both periodic 
and lifetime limits may apply.  
8 
In reality defaults are also associated with trigger events such as divorce, job loss 
or medical impairment.  
9 
The yield or internal rate of return on a mortgage can be solved for by setting the 
value of the mortgage equal to the present discounted value of all future payments. For example, 
a fully amortizing 30-year $100 loan with an interest rate of 8% must pay approximately 73 
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cents per month to pay off the loan (0 =−$100 +Σt $0.73/(1.08)t). If there was a 3% upfront fee 
then the borrower only actually receives $97 and the effective yield on the loan increases to 
8.32% (0 =−$97 +Σt $0.73/(1.0832)t ).  
10 
Adjustable-rate loans typically are indexed to a public interest rate such as a 
Treasury yield or the LIBOR. The fully adjusted rate is then the index rate plus a spread or 
margin above the index.  
11 
More formally, we assume that there is an underlying regression relationship between 
the spread (Sj) and exogenous explanatory variables (xj ), such that ;2  Y2K  F2. Sj is only 
observed if 526  J2  0, where zj is a vector explanatory variables, 6 are estimated coefficients, 
F2~[	0, \, J2~[	0,1 and corr 	F, J  `. 
12 
Greene (1981) shows that the standard errors using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
can be biased up or down. Greene provides the formula to correct the variance-covariance 
matrix and the SAS code used to conduct the estimation and correct the standard errors was 
downloaded from http://support.sas.com/ctx/samples/index.jsp?sid=476 on June 30, 2006. The 
author of the code is David A. Jaeger, The University of Michigan, davej@umich.edu. In addition, 
there is another potential sample selection problem because the selection of locations into those 
who have a law and those who do not is not random. However, due to individual loan data, it is 
unlikely that the individual-loan-level errors will be correlated with that of a state-level selection 
equation.  
13 
Specification tests including borrower income were insignificant and are not 
reported.  
14 
Loans that do not meet the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loan limit (conventional 
conforming loan limit) are not included in the sample. In addition, concerns that loan size is an 
endogenous variable are mitigated by including only very gross loan size dummies and are not 
the focus of this article. Passmore, Sherlund and Burgess (2005) follow a similar strategy and 
include only a dummy for small loans.  
15 
See Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) and Crews Cutts and Van 
Order (2005) for explanations of subprime underwriting and pricing.  
16 
To test whether the same results would be found if upfront fees and points are 
excluded from the spread, a model is run using the interest rate spread as the dependent 
variable using 2005 loan originations data from LoanPerformance ABS. The findings were very 
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similar to those found using HMDA and the APR and are available in Table A2. For example, 
the impact of the typical law was a reduction in the spread by 0.6 basis points, while the HMDA 
APR results found a 0.8 basis point reduction in the spread. In addition, we attempted to match 
HMDA to the LoanPerformance data set to obtain APR information. Our overall 1-to-1 matching 
rate is 15% while requiring a perfect match on location, loan amount, lien status, loan purpose, 
property type and occupancy status. We estimate a similar specification, using all available loan 
information to explain APR spread. We find that the models generally have poor fit, weak 
precision and some nonsensible coefficient estimates. We conclude that our matching is largely 
inaccurate and therefore do not report the results.  
17 
Over the period 1998–2005 2/28 ARM make up approximately 75% of the 
adjustable-rate market (calculated from the LoanPerformance database).  
18 
One drawback of this approach is that LoanPerformance data quality and market 
coverage tend to decline the further back you go in time.  
19 
The U.S. Census reports ZIP code tabulation areas, which were matched to the 
five-digit postal ZIP codes provided in the loan-level data. In addition, if neighborhoods change 
rapidly through time these variables will be measured with additional error.  
20 
Over 98% of the 2/28 adjustable-rate loans in our sample have these features.  
21 
Additional specification tests were conducted by interacting FICO with LTV to test 
for evidence that the marginal cost of providing a smaller down payment increases for 
borrowers with lower credit scores. Evidence was found of this effect for fixed-rate loans, but not 
for adjustable-rate loans. All other coefficient estimates were not materially affected by including 
FICO and LTV interactions.  
22 
In the prime mortgage market Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require that loans with 
less than a 20% down payment also have PMI. As a result, PMI and LTV are almost perfectly 
collinear. This relationship does not hold in subprime. Many loans with little or even no equity do 
not have PMI, but they are charged directly through upfront fees and the periodic interest rate 
for the increased credit risk.  
23 
Various specification tests showed that lifetime caps may also play a role, but they 
are usually insignificant and highly collinear with other cap measures. Therefore, one way to 
interpret the results on the cap variables is as a general measure of cap strength.  
24 
Indicating the importance of controlling for the unique features associated with 
adjustable-rate loans, additional specification tests that did not include measures of adjustment 
rate caps lead to larger and more negative coefficient estimates for Ineffect.  
26  Pennington-Cross & Ho 
 
25 
With two different interest rates (one rate for the first two years and another rate for 
the remaining 28 years) the blended rate is calculated by numerically searching for the discount 
rate that equates the 30 years of payments to the initial loan amount.  
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Appendix  
Table 1 
The law index 
 
State Full Index Coverage Index Restrictions Index 
Arkansas 10.06 2.73 7.33 
California 7.07 5.09 1.98 
Chicago, IL 12.64 10.20 2.43 
Cleveland, OH 15.19 4.35 10.84 
Colorado 16.19 12.87 3.31 
Connecticut 6.92 2.73 4.20 
Cook County, IL 12.64 10.20 2.43 
Florida 1.98 0.00 1.98 
Georgia 14.88 4.13 10.76 
Illinois 17.16 8.73 8.43 
Indiana 7.55 2.36 5.19 
Kentucky 4.95 0.74 4.22 
Maine 1.47 1.47 0.00 
Maryland 10.51 5.84 4.67 
Massachusetts 9.68 4.13 5.55 
Nevada 1.47 1.47 0.00 
New Jersey 6.27 3.13 3.14 
New Mexico 12.91 6.28 6.63 
New York 6.82 4.13 2.69 
North Carolina 5.07 1.11 3.96 
Ohio 2.38 1.47 0.90 
Oklahoma 4.59 0.74 3.85 
Pennsylvania 2.92 1.47 1.44 
South Carolina 8.83 2.36 6.47 
Texas 3.79 0.74 3.06 
Utah 2.55 1.47 1.08 
Washington, D.C. 14.89 10.50 4.39 
Wisconsin 2.63 1.55 1.08 
Average 8.00 4.00 4.00 
Standard Deviation 4.98 3.52 2.87 
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Table 2  
List of metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas 
 
 Variable Name Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas 
ar1 Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers AM-MO 
ar2 Memphis TN-MS-AR 
dc Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC-VA-WV 
ga1 Chattanooga TN-GA 
ga2 Columbus GA-AL 
il1 Burlington IA-IL 
il2 Cape Girardeau-Jackson MO-IL 
il3 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island IA-IL 
il4 Quincy IL-MO 
il5 St Louis MO-IL 
in South Bend-Mishawaka IN-MI 
ky1 Clarksville TN-KY 
ky2 Huntington-Ashland WV-KY 
ky3 Union City TN-KY 
ma1 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy MA-NH 
ma2 Providence-New Bedford-Fall River RI-MA 
md1 Cumberland MD-WV 
md2 Hagerstown-Martinsburg MD-WV 
nc Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News VA-NC 
oh1 Parkersburg-Marietta WV-OH 
oh2 Point Pleasant WV-OH 
oh3 Weirton-Steubenville WV-OH 
oh4 Wheeling WV-OH 
pa Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington PA-DE 
ut Logan UT-ID 
wi1 Duluth MN-WI 
w12 Iron Mountain MI-WI 
wi3 La Crosse WI-MN 
wi4 Marinette WI-MI 
wi5 Minneapolis-St Paul-Bloomington MN-WI 
 
Notes: Cross-sectional (HMDA) estimation excludes laws that are passed in 2004 (IL, IN, UT, WI).  
  
29  Pennington-Cross & Ho 
 
 
Table 3  
Definition of HMDA variable 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent Variables 
Report Dummy indicating that the APR spread on the loan is 
reported in HMDA. The cutoff is 3% for first liens. 
HMDA 2004 
Spread Annual Percentage Rate (APR) minus yield on Treasury 
securities of comparable maturity (%). 
HMDA 2004 
Identification 
Ineffect Dummy indicates loan is in location with a predatory 
lending law in effect. Loans in locations without a law in 
effect are the reference group. 
Table 1* 
Law index Index indicating strength of predatory lending law. Table 1 
Coverage index Index indicating strength of predatory lending law in terms 
of market coverage. The coverage index plus the 
restrictions index equals the “full” law index. 
Table 1 
Restrictions index Index indicating strength of predatory lending law in terms 
of the extent of restrictions and requirements placed on 
mortgage types and lending practices. The coverage index 
plus the restrictions index equals the “full” law index. 
Table 1 
High_coverage Dummy indicating high coverage index value (>75th 
percentile). 
Table 1 
High_restrictions Dummy indicating high restrictions index value (>75th 
percentile). 
Table 1 
Mortgage 
Small_loan Dummy indicates loan amounts in the lower quartile of 
observed loan amounts. The two middle quartiles is the 
reference group. 
HMDA 2004 
Large_loan Dummy indicates loan amounts in the upper quartile of 
observed loan amounts. The two middle quartiles is the 
reference group. 
HMDA 2004 
Home-improv Dummy indicates loan is contracted for home 
improvement purpose. Home purchase is the reference 
group. 
HMDA 2004 
Refi Dummy indicates loan is contracted for refinancing 
purpose. Home purchase is the reference group. 
HMDA 2004 
Investor Dummy indicates nonowner-occupancy status. Owner 
occupied is the reference group. 
HMDA 2004 
Location/Borrower 
FICO_tract Average FICO scores of Census tract. Calculated 
from LP 
database 
Hispanic Dummy indicates borrower is of Hispanic or Latino 
ethnicity. The reference group is non-Hispanic 
HMDA 2004 
Nonwhite Dummy indicates borrower is of a race other than white. 
The reference group is white. 
HMDA 2004 
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Income Income of the borrower. HMDA 2004 
Loan2inc Loan-to-income ratio. Calculated 
from HMDA 
2004 
Urban Percentage urban population of census tract. Census 2000 
Vacant Percentage vacant housing units of census tract. Census 2000 
∗See Ho and Pennington-Cross (2005) for details on each law.  
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Table 4  
Descriptive statistics of HMDA variables  
 
Variable Mean SD 
Dependent variables 
Report 0.114 0.318 
Spread (%) 4.149 1.128 
Identification 
Ineffect 0.512 0.500 
Law index 3.998 4.761 
Coverage index 1.808 2.347 
Restrictions index 2.190 2.673 
High_coverage 0.039 0.193 
High_restricions 0.294 0.456 
Mortgage 
Small_loan 0.206 0.404 
Large_loan 0.294 0.456 
Home_improv 0.041 0.198 
Refi 0.558 0.497 
Investor 0.090 0.285 
Location/borrower 
FICO_tract 650.1 23.2 
Hispanic 0.050 0.218 
Nonwhite 0.170 0.376 
Income (thousand $) 94.9 106.2 
Loan2inc 2.618 1.784 
Urban 0.876 0.270 
Vacant 0.051 0.055 
 
Notes: Statistics for variable spread is calculated using the high-cost sample (report = 1); all other 
variables are calculated using the full sample.  
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Table 5 
Impact of predatory lending laws on APR spread  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Intercept 5.450** 0.289 5.433** 0.289 5.418** 0.289 
Identification 
Ineffect - - - - 0.035 0.056 
Law index -0.008 0.056 - - - - 
Coverage index - - -0.013 0.056 - - 
Restrictions index - - -0.003 0.013 - - 
High_coverage - - - - -0.179** 0.013 
High_restrictions - - - - -0.120** 0.014 
Mortgage 
Small_loan 0.383** 0.014 0.381** 0.022 0.379** 0.013 
Large_loan -0.102** 0.022 -0.103** 0.013 -0.102** 0.014 
Home_improv 0.273** 0.013 0.272** 0.014 0.272** 0.026 
Refi 0.167** 0.014 0.166** 0.027 0.166** 0.021 
Investor -0.082** 0.026 -0.081** 0.021 -0.081* 0.033 
Location/Borrower 
FICO_tract -0.314** 0.013 -0.309** 0.014 -0.308** 0.022 
Hispanic 0.042 0.021 0.038 0.033 0.039 0.020 
Nonwhite 0.213** 0.031 0.212** 0.020 0.213** 0.021 
ar1 0.331** 0.020 0.311** 0.021 0.335** 0.025 
ar2 0.287** 0.020 0.285** 0.026 0.288** 0.038 
dc -0.067** 0.025 -0.060 0.042 -0.063 0.039 
ga1 0.176** 0.038 0.167** 0.039 0.168** 0.046 
ga2 0.251** 0.039 0.224** 0.045 0.222** 0.087 
ky1 -0.003 0.045 -0.008 0.087 -0.024 0.028 
ky2 0.009 0.087 0.004 0.026 -0.021 0.024 
ky3 0.374** 0.026 0.373** 0.024 0.371** 0.065 
ma1 -0.094** 0.024 -0.096 0.062 -0.087* 0.040 
ma2 -0.178** 0.062 -0.177** 0.038 -0.174** 0.056 
md1 0.168** 0.038 0.174** 0.055 0.213 0.115 
md2 -0.012 0.055 -0.007 0.114 0.021 0.060 
oh1 -0.097 0.114 -0.093 0.059 -0.114 0.060 
oh2 0.054 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.024 0.026 
oh3 -0.045 0.060 -0.040* 0.021 -0.076** 0.021 
oh4 -0.072** 0.020 -0.067** 0.004 -0.092** 0.034 
pa -0.098** 0.001 -0.095** 0.004 -0.144** 0.028 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 
1 0.283** 0.051 0.276** 0.051 0.279** 0.051 
Number of loans 69,139 69,139 69,139 
Notes: Second stage of Heckman two-step selection correction estimation; HMDA 2004 cross-section; 
dependent variable is spread between APR and T-bill rate of comparable maturity; FICO_tract is 
expressed in 100s; **indicates significance at the 1% level and * indicates significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 6 
Definition of LoanPerformance variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
spread_frm Spread on fixed-rate loans: interest rate minus yield on 10-year T-bill 
(%). 
spread_arm Spread on adjustable-rate loans: margin = fully indexed rate – 6-month 
LIBOR (%). 
Identification 
Law Dummy indicates location with a predatory lending law. 
Postlaw Dummy indicates postlegislation time period. 
Ineffect Interaction of law and postlaw indicating property is in a location with a 
law currently effective. 
Law index Index indicating strength of predatory lending law. 
Coverage index Index indicating strength of predatory lending law in terms of market 
coverage. The coverage index plus the restrictions index equals the “full” 
law index. 
Restrictions index Index indicating the strength of predatory lending law in terms of the 
extent of restrictions and requirements placed on mortgage types and 
lending practices. The coverage index plus the restrictions index equals 
the “full” law index. 
High_coverage Dummy indicating high coverage index value (>75th percentile). 
High_restrictions Dummy indicating high restrictions index value (>75th percentile). 
Borrower/Mortgage 
FICO Borrower’s Fair Isaac Credit score. 
ltv Loan-to-value ratio. 
Small_loan Dummy indicates loan amounts in the lower quartile of observed loan 
amounts. The two middle quartiles are the reference group. 
Large_loan Dummy indicates loan amounts in the upper quartile of observed loan 
amounts. The two middle quartiles are the reference groups. 
PMI Dummy indicates loan has private mortgage insurance. 
Lowdoc Dummy indicates borrower provides low document. Full document is the 
reference group. 
Nodoc Dummy indicates borrower provides no document.  Full document is the 
reference group. 
Refi_cashout Dummy indicates loan is contracted for refinancing purpose, with cash 
out. Purchase is the reference group. 
Refi_nocash Dummy indicates loan is contracted for refinancing purpose, no cash 
out. Purchase is the reference group 
Other-purpose Dummy indicates loan is contracted for another purpose. Purchase is 
the reference group. 
Investor Dummy indicates nonowner-occupancy status. Owner occupied is the 
reference group 
ARM only 
Teaser Spread between initial interest rate and fully indexed rate. 
fcap First-period cap as percentage of initial interest rate. 
pcap Periodic cap as percentage of initial interest rate. 
libor_var SD in the index (six-month LIBOR) over the previous six months. 
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Table 7 
Descriptive statistics of LoanPerformance variables 
 FRM Sample ARM Sample 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
Dependent variables 
Spread_frm 3.290 1.495 - - 
Spread_arm - - 6.247 1.059 
Identification 
Law 0.338 0.473 0.281 0.450 
Postlaw 0.565 0.496 0.672 0.469 
Ineffect 0.207 0.405 0.206 0.405 
Law index 1.829 4.247 1.998 4.512 
Coverage index 0.866 2.180 0.936 2.271 
Restrictions index 0.963 2.266 1.063 2.385 
High_coverage 0.047 0.212 0.054 0.225 
High_restrictions 0.109 0.311 0.137 0.344 
Borrower/Mortgage 
FICO 659.7 72.1 596.6 57.4 
ltv 78.0 15.7 81.8 11.5 
Small_loan 0.295 0.456 0.225 0.418 
Large_loan 0.200 0.400 0.173 0.378 
PMI 0.292 0.454 0.272 0.445 
Lowdoc 0.308 0.462 0.276 0.447 
Nodoc 0.029 0.168 0.006 0.075 
Refi_cashout 0.552 0.497 0.549 0.498 
Refi_nocash 0.168 0.374 0.116 0.321 
Other_purpose 0.001 0.032 0.001 0.024 
Investor 0.146 0.354 0.073 0.260 
ARM only 
Teaser - - 0.324 1.518 
fcap - - 0.300 0.119 
pcap - - 0.140 0.042 
labor_var - - 0.243 0.154 
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Table 8 
Fixed-rate mortgage-spread results  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Intercept 7.627** 0.210 7.639** 0.210 7.640** 0.210 
Identification 
Ineffect - - - - -0.123* 0.057 
Law index 0.004 0.003 - - - - 
Coverage index - - -0.017 0.010 - - 
Restrictions 
index 
- - 0.027** 0.010 - - 
High_coverage - - - - 0.032 0.067 
High_restrictions - - - - 0.222** 0.067 
Borrower/Mortgage 
FICO -0.011** 0.000 -0.011** 0.000 -0.011 0.000 
ÎJ 0.046** 0.003 0.046** 0.003 0.046** 0.003 
Small_loan 0.477** 0.014 0.477** 0.014 0.476** 0.014 
Large_loan -0.109** 0.016 -0.110** 0.016 -0.110** 0.016 
PMI 0.206** 0.012 0.206** 0.012 0.206** 0.012 
Lowdoc 0.154** 0.012 0.154** 0.012 0.154** 0.012 
Nodoc 0.436** 0.032 0.437** 0.032 0.437** 0.032 
Refi_cashout -0.168** 0.013 -0.168** 0.013 -0.168** 0.013 
Refi_nocash -0.331** 0.017 -0.331** 0.017 -0.330** 0.017 
Other_purpose 0.255 0.164 0.252 0.164 0.254 0.164 
Investor 0.102** 0.016 0.102** 0.016 0.102** 0.016 
Adjusted R2 0.461 0.461 0.461 
Number of loans 51,197 51,197 51,197 
 
Notes: Second-stage results of two stage least squares (2SLS), LoanPerformance panel 1998–2005; 
dependent variable is spread between interest rate and 10-year T-bill; FICO and ltv are expressed in 10’s; 
ÎJ is predicted value of ltv from first stage; coefficients for MSA, law and postlaw dummies are not 
reported; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 1% level and ∗ indicates significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 9 
Adjustable-rate mortgage spread (margin) results  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
intercept 10.388** 0.197 10.395** 0.197 10.391** 0.197 
Identification 
Ineffect - - - - -0.058 0.044 
Law index -0.006** 0.002 - - - - 
Coverage index - - -0.024** 0.009 - - 
Restrictions 
index 
- - 0.013 0.009 - - 
High_coverage - - - - -0.111* 0.049 
High_restrictions - - - - 0.068 0.052 
Borrower/Mortgage 
Teaser 0.587** 0.003 0.587** 0.003 0.587** 0.003 
fcap -2.275** 0.034 -2.275** 0.034 -2.275** 0.034 
pcap -7.994** 0.091 -7.997** 0.091 -7.997** 0.091 
libor_var -0.354** 0.028 -0.354** 0.028 -0.354** 0.028 
FICO -0.005** 0.000 -0.005** 0.000 -0.005** 0.000 
ÎJ -0.013 0.004 -0.013** 0.004 -0.013** 0.004 
Small_loan 0.209** 0.009 0.208** 0.009 0.208** 0.009 
Large_loan -0.114** 0.010 -0.114** 0.010 -0.114** 0.010 
PMI -0.058** 0.008 -0.058** 0.008 -0.058** 0.008 
Lowdoc 0.102** 0.008 0.102** 0.008 0.102** 0.008 
Nodoc -0.322** 0.045 -0.322** 0.045 -0.323** 0.045 
Refi_cashout -0.180** 0.008 -0.180** 0.008 -0.180** 0.008 
Refi_nocash -0.182** 0.012 -0.182** 0.012 -0.182** 0.012 
Other_purpose 0.435** 0.141 0.434** 0.141 0.435** 0.141 
Investor 0.120** 0.014 0.120** 0.014 0.120** 0.014 
Adjusted R2 0.463 0.463 0.463 
Number of loans 57,747 57,747 57,747 
 
Notes: Second-stage results of 2SLS, LoanPerformance panel 1998–2005; dependent variable is spread 
between fully indexed rate and six-month LIBOR (margin); FICO and ltv are expressed in 10s; ÎJ is 
predicted value of ltv from first stage; coefficients for MSA, law and postlaw dummies are not reported; ∗∗ 
indicates significance at the 1% level and ∗ indicates significance at the 5% level.  
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Figure 1 
APR distribution for first liens—HMDA 2004  
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Table A1 
Results for selection (probit) equation-HMDA estimation dependent variable is report. 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. 
Intercept 5.871** 0.098 
Income -0.110** 0.004 
Loan2inc 0.012** 0.001 
Urban 0.117** 0.009 
Vacant 1.064** 0.043 
Small_loan 0.156** 0.006 
Large_loan -0.025** 0.007 
Home_improv 0.271** 0.011 
Refi 0.222** 0.005 
Investor 0.044** 0.008 
FICO_tract -1.125** 0.015 
Hispanic 0.479** 0.009 
Nonwhite 0.440** 0.006 
ar1 0.032* 0.016 
ar2 0.264** 0.011 
dc -0.215** 0.009 
ga1 0.148** 0.015 
ga2 0.015 0.021 
ky1 0.031 0.023 
ky2 -0.327** 0.024 
ky3 -0.145** 0.056 
ma1 -0.385** 0.009 
ma2 -0.325** 0.010 
md1 -0.210** 0.035 
md2 -0.150** 0.020 
oh1 -0.444** 0.028 
oh2 -0.648** 0.060 
oh3 -0.451** 0.031 
oh4 -0.483** 0.031 
pa -0.295** 0.009 
Number of loans 607,630 
 
** indicates significant at the 1% level and * indicates significance at the 5% level. Log likelihood = -
193,543.00. 
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Table A2 
Interest rate spread results, 2004 cross-section, LoanPerformance data  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Intercept 6.779** 0.159 6.710** 0.160 6.748** 0.159 
Identification 
Ineffect - - - - -0.036 0.019 
Law_index -0.006** 0.001 - - - - 
Coverage index - - -0.028** 0.003 - - 
Restrictions 
index 
- - 0.017** 0.003 - - 
High_coverage - - - - -0.142** 0.032 
High_restrictions - - - - 0.027 0.024 
Borrower/Mortgage 
FICO -0.012** 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.012 0.000 
ÎJ 0.040** 0.002 0.041** 0.002 0.041** 0.002 
Small_loan 0.258** 0.011 0.252** 0.011 0.255** 0.011 
Large_loan -0.058** 0.010 -0.062** 0.010 -0.062** 0.010 
PMI 0.202** 0.009 0.202** 0.009 0.203** 0.009 
Lowdoc 0.098** 0.008 0.098** 0.008 0.098** 0.008 
Nodoc -0.672** 0.027 -0.671** 0.027 -0.671** 0.027 
Refi_cashout -0.286** 0.009 -0.283** 0.009 -0.284** 0.009 
Refi-nocash -0.436** 0.014 -0.434** 0.014 -0.434** 0.014 
Other_purpose 1.440** 0.203 1.439** 0.204 1.441** 0.203 
Investor 0.037** 0.013 0.041** 0.013 0.040** 0.013 
Adjusted R2 0.296  0.295  0.296  
Number of loans 117,119 117,119 117,119 
 
Notes: See Table 6 for variable definitions. Second-stage results of 2SLS results reported using 
LoanPerformance data for loans originated in 2004. The dependent variable is spread between interest 
rate and T-bill rate of comparable maturity regardless of product type. FICO and ltv are expressed in 10s; 
ÎJ is the predicted value of LTV from first stage. ∗∗ indicates significance at the 1% level and ∗ indicates 
significance at the 5% level.  
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Table A3 
First-stage estimation of loan-to-value ratio (ltv).  
 FRM sample ARM sample 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Intercept 72.543** 3.389 48.954** 2.353 
Borrower/Market 
FICO 0.012** 0.001 0.053** 0.001 
frm_30 -0.463 0.248 -0.069 0.184 
Income 0.110** 0.014 0.107** 0.012 
Incomesq -0.001** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 
Age 0.295 0.167 0.302** 0.114 
Agesq -0.009** 0.002 -0.007** 0.002 
Time 
y98 -1.280 0.892 -4.146** 1.393 
y99 0.190 0.738 -2.038** 0.598 
y00 0.120 0.667 -2.698** 0.478 
y01 2.600** 0.451 -1.264** 0.318 
y02 2.816** 0.324 -1.779** 0.196 
y0-3 0.896** 0.254 -1.353** 0.145 
y04 0.362 0.277 -0.523** 0.141 
Location 
ar1 2.735** 0.821 1.913** 0.739 
ar2 3.332** 0.632 3.043** 0.611 
dc -5.102** 0.632 -3.621** 0.608 
ga1 3.522** 0.696 2.248** 0.678 
ga2 2.803** 0.820 3.051** 0.834 
il1 7.927** 2.403 0.831 1.192 
il2 -0.106 1.394 3.237** 1.007 
il3 3.903** 0.828 1.945** 0.672 
il4 4.847 3.072 4.507* 1.894 
il5 0.683 0.626 0.968 0.599 
in 3.784** 0.740 1.680** 0.651 
ky1 3.654** 0.917 1.818* 0.827 
ky2 4.207** 1.071 2.544** 0.871 
ky3 4.963* 2.214 2.743 1.780 
ma1 -6.947** 0.601 -7.893** 0.587 
ma2 -3.462** 0.659 -3.111** 0.610 
md1 7.539** 1.542 1.141 1.517 
md2 -1.058 0.989 0.337 0.890 
oh1 3.165* 1.410 3.296* 1.421 
oh2 2.074 3.071 1.144 2.684 
oh3 5.599** 1.295 1.688 1.113 
oh4 2.926* 1.405 1.342 1.239 
pa -1.370* 0.590 -1.075 0.591 
ut -2.819* 1.283 -2.011* 0.966 
wi1 -0.649 0.867 -0.533 0.711 
wi2 1.860 3.940 2.697 1.693 
wi3 1.383 1.625 0.674 1.028 
wi4 0.441 1.530 -0.773 0.941 
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wi5 -4.190** 0.631 -2.207** 0.602 
Number of Loans 51,197 57,747 
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.172 
 
Notes: nc is the excluded metropolitan area; ∗∗ indicates significance at 1% level, ∗ indicates significance 
at 5% level. LoanPerformance data.  
 
Table A3 provides the first-stage results used to calculate the predicted ltv for Models 1, 
2 and 3 for both the adjustable-and fixed-rate loans as reported in Tables 8 and 9. The results 
substantially meet prior expectations. For example, the proxies for wealth indicate that older 
borrowers and borrowers with more income are able to support smaller down payments. 
However, the relationships are both nonlinear. Also consistent with subprime underwriting 
requirements, borrowers with worse credit history tend to provide larger down payments to 
compensate for the increased credit risk associated with lower credit scores. Consistent with 
Ambrose, LaCour-Little and Sanders (2004) the market interest rate is negatively associated 
with down payments for fixed-rate loans. The time dummy variables control for changing 
macroeconomic conditions that could impact subprime interest rates and MSA dummies also 
proxy for other missing variables such as the affordability of housing. Therefore, we have no 
strong priors on the sign or magnitude of these variables.  
 
